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We reveal motivations of Chinese firms for issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) by 
examining why firms change the use of SEO proceeds and how they use unspecified SEO 
proceeds. Using 533 SEOs issued by Chinese firms during 1999-2006, we find that firms do 
not use unspecified SEO proceeds on capital investment regardless of the nature of 
controlling shareholders. We find that if the controlling shareholder is the state, then the firm 
uses unspecified proceeds to stockpile cash; if the controlling shareholder is a parent state-
owned enterprise, then the firm uses unspecified proceeds on retiring debt and on related 
party transactions. 
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 1. Introduction 
Firms are supposed to have good reasons to issue Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO). According to the 
pecking order theory of corporate finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984), a firm will only use equity financing 
when it has to do so, because asymmetric information is the severest for equity financing among means of 
external financing. However, contrary to theory, firms are passionate about using SEOs to raise additional 
equity (e.g. Henderson, et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2005). This obvious discrepancy between theory 
and practice calls for academic attention on why firms frequently use SEOs to raise additional capital. 
The fundamental principle of corporate finance requires that a firm’s equity financing behaviour is in 
line with shareholders’ interest. However, a historical puzzle concerning SEOs is that issuing firms often 
suffer from underperformance in the years subsequent to SEOs in terms of both long-term stock returns 
(e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) and long-term operating performance 
(e.g. Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Although the phenomenon of SEO underperformance is widely 
documented, the mechanisms through which SEOs bring about underperformance have been mainly 
confined to the market timing explanation, while other possible mechanisms are still not explicitly 
investigated in the literature. Recently, research on corporate SEO behaviour has been focusing on why 
firms want to issue SEOs (Dittmar and Thakor, 2007) and who are issuing equity (Fama and French, 
2005). There are four conventional theories regarding SEO motives: financing for investment, adjusting 
capital structure, avoiding agency problems, and market timing (see Bo et al., 2011). In addition, 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) document that the near-term need for cash also drives firms to issue SEOs.   
It is important to note that recent research on SEO motives is a response to the puzzle of SEO 
underperformance. Scholars want to link the firm’s true motivations for issuing SEOs with the 
consequences of these SEOs on the firm’s long-term performance. A general approach taken by the 
research on SEO motives is to examine how the firm uses SEO proceeds (Jeanneret, 2005; Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008; Walker and Yost, 2008; Autore et al., 2009; and Fu, 2010). The logic of this line of 
research is either to explain changes in the firm’s accounting variables subsequent to SEOs by the use of 
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SEO proceeds or to examine whether the firm’s post-issue performance differs across types of the use of 
SEO proceeds. An alternative approach is to examine SEO motives by linking the firm’s pre-issue real 
and financial activities to the issuance of SEOs in order to reveal what drives the firm to issue SEOs (e.g. 
Bo et al., 2011; DeAngelo et al., 2010). Hence the connection between the firm’s pre-issue characteristics 
and SEOs can provide indirect inference concerning why the firm issues SEOs.   
The use of SEO proceeds should be consistent with one or more of the above-mentioned SEO 
motives. If the firm issues SEOs for the purpose of financing new investment, we should observe that the 
firm would use SEO proceeds on capital expenditures; if the firm issues SEOs in order to re-adjust its 
capital structure, we should observe that the firm would use SEO proceeds to retire debt; if the firm issues 
SEOs to relieve near-term liquidity pressure, then we should observe that the firm uses SEO proceeds on 
short-term operating expenditures, such as cash stock. However, the ambiguity arises if the firm issues 
SEOs as a result of agency conflicts or the firm issues SEOs to take the advantage of the overvalued stock 
prices, i.e. to time the market, under which circumstances it is difficult to predict what will be the ultimate 
use of SEO proceeds. Since in both cases, SEO proceeds can be used with a great deal of managerial 
discretion. Therefore, it is important to examine where these SEO proceeds are ultimately used in order to 
reveal true motivations of the firm for issuing SEOs. However, the research on SEO motives has been 
mainly based on mature stock markets, and certainly not in detail for a highly interesting market, our 
example case of China.   
Chinese firms have been active in using SEOs to raise equity capital (e.g. Bo et al., 2011). One 
important observation from the Chinese stock market is that firms often specify the intended/planned use 
of proceeds from issuing SEOs in their proxy reports beforehand, but after conducting SEOs firms often 
change the use of SEO proceeds. For example, based on the 533 sample SEO cases over 1999-2006 that 
we examine in this paper, the average ratio of planned use of SEO proceeds on investment to total SEO 
proceeds is 95.29%, but the average ratio of realised use on investment to total SEO proceeds is 73.60%. 
This suggests that a significant proportion of SEO proceeds (22.34%), being specified in firms’ proxy 
reports to finance new investments, has been switched to elsewhere. In addition, based on this sample, we 
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also observe that the average ratio of planned use of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes is 
3.69%, but the average ratio of realised use for corporate general purposes is 25.97%. Obviously, firms 
have switched the use of SEO proceeds (22.27%) from elsewhere to the category of corporate general 
purposes. Taking together, we observe that firms promise potential investors to use SEO proceeds on new 
investment in their issue reports, but after SEOs are issued, many firms change the plan of using SEO 
proceeds by putting more SEO proceeds into the category of corporate general purposes, while in the 
meantime they reduce the use of SEO proceeds on new investment. We refer the above-mentioned 
conduct to the “bait and switch” tactic regarding the use of SEO proceeds. It is important to note that the 
destination for the use of SEO proceeds in the category of general corporate purposes is unspecified, the 
firm is not legally required to declare how and where these SEO proceeds will be used ultimately, hence 
the use of these unspecified SEO proceeds can reveal true motivations of the firm for issuing SEOs. 
Moreover, we also observe that such “bait and switch” behavior is observed for the majority of issuing 
firms in our sample. More specifically, out of total 533 sample SEO cases we examine in this paper, there 
are 377 cases (70.73%) that have increased the amount of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate 
general purposes. The above-mentioned observations make people sceptical about true motivations of the 
firm for issuing SEOs. How to explain this “bait and switch” behaviour regarding the use of SEO 
proceeds? Whether or not controlling shareholders of such firms are involved in this “bait and switch” 
tactic?  How do firms use unspecified SEO proceeds ultimately?  In this paper, we provide answers to 
these questions.  
 We examine 533 SEOs issued by Chinese firms during 1999-2006.1 We pay special attention to 
the use of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes. Because the destination for the use 
of this type of SEO proceeds is officially unspecified and essentially unknown, the ultimate use of these 
unspecified SEO proceeds can reveal true motivations of the firm for issuing SEOs. Given that the 
observed problem is the “bait and switch” tactic regarding the use of SEO proceeds, the most suspicious 
1 In order to examine how the firm uses unspecified SEO proceeds, we need to follow every SEO case to 3 years 
after the SEO year, therefore, our effective sample period covers the period of 1999-2009. 
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reason why firms conduct such a “bait and switch” tactic concerns controlling shareholders of issuing 
firms. This conjecture is supported by the widely documented evidence that the conflict between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is severe in Chinese listed firms (e.g. Jiang et al., 2010; 
Berkman et al., 2009). Therefore, we focus on how the nature of controlling shareholders is associated 
with such “bait and switch” behavior regarding the use of SEO proceeds. The results show that the 
controlling shareholder’s ownership significantly increases the probability of changing the use of SEO 
proceeds, particularly when the controlling shareholder is the state or a parent State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) of the listed firm. For firms in which controlling shareholders are other legal persons (mainly 
private), there is no clear-cut connection between the controlling shareholder’s ownership and the 
likelihood of switching. In the second step of the empirical analysis, we examine how firms use 
unspecified SEO proceeds. We document that sample firms in general do not use unspecified SEO 
proceeds on capital investment regardless of the nature of controlling shareholders. However, the nature 
of controlling shareholders does matter for the use of SEO proceeds on other activities rather than capital 
investment. The results show that (a) the state-controlled firms often use unspecified SEO proceeds to 
stockpile cash up to 3 years after SEOs, (b) the firms that are controlled by their parent SOEs use 
unspecified SEO proceeds to retire debt and to conduct related party transactions, suggesting that the “bait 
and switch” tactic may be used by the controlling shareholder for the purpose of tunneling, and (c) there 
is no clear-cut result concerning how firms in which controlling shareholders are other legal persons use 
unspecified SEO proceeds.  
 We contribute to the literature from the following two aspects. Firstly, we reveal SEO motives by 
examining ex post information on the use of unspecified SEO proceeds, i.e., we examine how the firm 
ultimately uses SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes that are unspecified in use 
beforehand, whereas previous studies have mainly used either total SEO proceeds (e.g. Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008) or ex ante (the stated) information on the use of SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes (e.g. Jeanneret, 2005; Autore et al., 2009). It is worth mentioning that using ex 
ante (the stated) information on the use of unspecified SEO proceeds to infer SEO motives can only be a 
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valid approach if the firm does not change the plan regarding the use of SEO proceeds after the issuance, 
which is rarely seen in the corporate practice. Moreover, since total SEO proceeds contain all types of use, 
including investment, debt repayment, and corporate general purposes, it is difficult to infer SEO motives 
if total SEO proceeds are used. Therefore, in this paper we pay special attention to the realized use of 
SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes. Because the destination for the use of this 
type of SEO proceeds is essentially unknown, the ultimate use of these unspecified SEO proceeds can 
reveal true motivations of the firm for issuing SEOs. It may be the nature of ambiguity of this category 
that provides the firm with a lot of flexibility in deciding how to use SEO proceeds ultimately.  
 Secondly, we contribute to the SEO literature by providing some new evidence on how features 
of Chinese corporate governance distinguish Chinese firms from mature firms regarding the use of SEO 
proceeds. More specifically, we provide two results revealing Chinese characteristics. First, we show that 
the state-dominated formal financing channel and the large state ownership of listed firms in China result 
in distorted allocation of capital raised from the stock market. Although it is widely documented that 
Chinese small and private enterprises have been lack of access to formal financing, many state-controlled 
firms, taking the advantage of being state-connected, can easily time the market in issuing seasoned 
equities and then stockpile SEO proceeds as cash for other purposes. Second, we provide new evidence 
on whether or not Chinese controlling shareholders are expropriating wealth from minority shareholders 
by examining the use of SEO proceeds. The standard SEO literature developed based on firms in mature 
market economies documents that the most common governance problem involved in the use of SEO 
proceeds is agency conflict between managers and shareholders (Autore et al., 2009; Walker and Yost, 
2008; and Fu, 2010). There is no available study on whether or not the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders explains the use of SEO proceeds. It is important to note that 
firms in emerging market economies suffer more serious conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders as compared to firms in mature markets (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 
2000; and Johnson et al., 2000). Moreover, it is widely documented that the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders is severer in Chinese listed firms (e.g. Jiang et al. 2010; Berkman 
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et al. 2009).  However, little attention is paid to this problem in the context of the use of SEO proceeds. 
To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on Chinese corporate governance have never 
examined such “bait and switch” behaviour regarding the use of SEO proceeds in order to reveal the most 
prevailing conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders suffered by Chinese listed 
firms.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant SEO literature. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 concerns empirical models and measurement of variables. Section 5 
discusses empirical results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The related SEO literature 
In the literature many studies on the use of SEO proceeds are designed to reveal SEO motives, which in 
turn helps explain why firms often suffer from underperformance subsequent to SEOs. We divide these 
studies into two streams: (a) studies on the relationship between changes in accounting variables and the 
use of SEO proceeds; and (b) studies that link the use of SEO proceeds to firm performance. 
 The logic of linking the use of SEO proceeds to accounting variables is to examine whether the 
use of SEO proceeds contributes to changes in some accounting variables subsequent to SEOs. Using 
12373 SEOs from 38 countries during 1990-2003, Kim and Weisbach (2008) examine how the use of 
SEO proceeds explains changes in some accounting variables, including capital expenditures, R&D, cash 
holding, and long-term debt reduction, inventory, etc. The authors provide evidence in supportive of both 
the financing for investment motive and the market timing motive, but there is no evidence that the firm 
uses SEO proceeds to repay long-term debt.  
 The main objective of studies linking the use of SEO proceeds to firm performance is to examine 
whether the use of SEO proceeds is a contributing factor to underperformance subsequent to SEOs. Using 
a sample of French rights offers, Jeanneret (2005) documents that sample firms’ long-term post-issue 
performance differs among types of use of SEO proceeds. More specifically, Jeanneret (2005) classifies 
the SEO samples based on ex ante (the stated/intended) information on the use of SEO proceeds into two 
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subsample groups, i.e., SEOs that are designated to finance new investment and that are designed to re-
adjust capital structure (debt repayment). Jeanneret (2005) finds that for the subsample of SEOs that are 
claimed to finance new investment, the issue firms suffer from long-run underperformance in stock 
returns, whereas SEO firms aiming to adjust capital structure do not suffer from underperformance. 
Jeanneret (2005) attributes the result concerning financing for investment to the overvaluation of 
investment payoffs and the persistence of this over-optimism through time.  
More recently, Autore et al. (2009) classify the use of SEO proceeds into three types, i.e., investment, 
debt repayment, and corporate general purposes. They examine ex ante (the stated) use of SEO proceeds 
and the firm’s post-SEOs long-term performance. These authors document negative abnormal returns for 
SEOs that are stated to repay debt and for corporate general purposes, whereas for SEOs that are stated to 
be used to finance new investment, there is no subsequent underperformance. Therefore, Autore et al. 
(2009) conclude that firms use SEOs to signal outside investors about the firm’s growth opportunities by 
explicitly stating that they will use SEO proceeds on new investment, whereas for SEOs that are stated to 
repay debt and for corporate general purposes, the firm issues SEOs mainly to time the market. Both 
Jeanneret (2005) and Autore et al. (2009) analyze ex ante (the stated/intended) information on the use of 
SEO proceeds reported in the firms’ proxy statements. It is worth mentioning that using ex ante (the 
stated/intended) information on the use of proceeds to reveal SEO motives can only be a valid approach if 
the firm does not change the plan regarding the use of SEO proceeds, which may be arguably the case in 
mature stock markets with strong investor protection but it is hardly the case for emerging markets due to 
weak investors’ protection. 
The signalling role of the SEO announcement is examined by Walker and Yost (2008), who link the 
use of SEO proceeds with the firm’s stock market reactions to the announcement of the firm’s SEOs. 
They claim that when the firm is given a choice between specifying the use of SEO proceeds and being 
ambiguous about it, only will the firms with good investment projects (i.e. growth opportunity) choose to 
specify the use of SEO proceeds. Alternatively, if the firm does not have good investment projects or the 
firm does not specify the use of SEO proceeds due to strategic concerns, then the firm will choose to be 
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ambiguous about the use of SEO proceeds in their issuing reports. Therefore, the firm that specifies the 
use of SEO proceeds will use the SEO announcement to signal the market about the firm’s confidence in 
future growth, which mitigates the asymmetric information problem. On the contrary, the cost of equity 
financing will be higher for the firms that choose to be ambiguous about the use of SEO proceeds. 
Following this logic of reasoning, Walker and Yost (2008) first classify their sample firms into three 
subgroups based on the stated (ex ante) primary use of the proceeds: investment, debt repayment, and 
corporate general purposes. They then explain the abnormal announcement returns by the standard event 
study methods against SEO proceeds controlling for other relevant variables for these three subgroups of 
firms, respectively. They find that the stock market reacts positively for firms that specify the use of 
proceeds for investment, but negatively for firms that choose to be ambiguous about the use of SEO 
proceeds by putting them into the category of corporate general purposes. The latter result can be 
explained by the dominance of the firms who choose not to specify due to agency problems of managerial 
rent-seeking, whereas the former result can be explained by that the information asymmetry problem is 
less severe for firms with good investment opportunities. Walker and Yost (2008) also document that, 
although the firm’s stated use of SEO proceeds is to repay debt, the firm actually does not use additional 
equity to repay debt.  
Fu (2010) analyzes the firm’s post-SEO operating performance by one particular type of use of SEO 
proceeds, i.e., overinvestment resulted from the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. He 
first checks four major types of uses of SEO proceeds: investing, retiring debt, increasing working capital, 
and hoarding cash. Fu (2010) documents that the dominant use of SEO proceeds is to expand investment 
mainly including capital expenditures and acquisition expenses. Firms do not primarily use SEO proceeds 
to retire debt. The increase in working capital is not significant in the long-run. Firms tend to hoard some 
SEO proceeds in cash. Since SEO proceeds are used dominantly on investment, Fu (2010) constructs a 
proxy for overinvestment measured by the difference between the issuing firm’s investment and the 
investment of the matched non-issuing firms. He finds a negative relationship between overinvestment 
and the firm’s post-SEO operating performance. Fu (2010) attributes the negative impact of 
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overinvestment on the firm’s post-SEO operating performance to the free cash flow problem that results 
from agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.  
 Based on the above-reviewed literatures on the use of SEO proceeds, we can summarise that (1) 
There are mainly three types of uses of SEO proceeds mentioned in the literature, i.e., investment, debt 
repayment, corporate general purposes (e.g. Autore et al., 2009; Walker and Yost, 2008; and Jeanneret, 
2005). Since the use of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes contains all unspecified destinations 
for the use of SEO proceeds, it is very likely that this type of use conceals true motivations of the firm for 
issuing SEOs. For this reason some studies treat whether or not the firm chooses to explicitly specify the 
use of SEO proceeds as a signal to the stock market (e.g. Walker and Yost, 2008; and Autore et al., 2009); 
(2) Among the above-mentioned SEO motives, SEO proceeds have been often used on new investment in 
many studies (e.g., Kim and Weisbach, 2008; Autore, et al., 2009; Walker and Yost, 2008; and Fu, 2010), 
but there is in general no evidence supporting the debt repayment motive (e.g., Kim and Weisbach, 2008; 
Walker and Yost, 2008; DeAngelo, et al., 2009; and Fu, 2010). The near-term need for cash as a SEO 
motive has received weak support (Fu, 2010). These studies find that SEO proceeds are mainly used 
either as a result of governance problems or due to market timing concerns, or both (e.g., Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008; Autore et al., 2009; Walker and Yost, 2008; and Fu, 2010); (3) The literature documents 
that the most common governance problem involved in the use of SEO proceeds is the agency conflict 
between managers and shareholders; little attention has been paid to the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders; (4) The main stream research on the use of SEO proceeds mainly 
focus on mature stock markets such as the US and the French stock markets. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study available in the published outlets that examines the connection between the 
nature of controlling shareholders and the use of SEO proceeds in the Chinese stock market. We fill in the 






3. The Data 
Our data are taken from the CCER/Sinofin database, which tracks the firm’s announcements of the use of 
SEO proceeds. Our research covers the period from 1999 up to and including 2006. The reason why we 
start from 1999 is because information on both the ownership structure and the cash flow statement for 
Chinese listed firms only became available in 1998 and we need the one-year lagged observations for 
many variables. We start with all SEO cases in the Chinese stock market during 1999-2006. Among these 
SEO cases we further track down the SEO cases that report the information on the ultimate use of 
proceeds. Since we need to follow the firm’s real and financial activities up to three years after the 
issuance of SEOs, we use SEO cases up to and including 2006 to ensure that the observations on the 
variables are available in three years subsequent to SEOs. Therefore, our effective sample period is 1998-
2009, but we use the SEO cases during 1999-2006 in the econometric models. There are 533 SEO cases 
during 1999-2006 whose information on the ultimate use of SEO proceeds is available, which accounts 
for 74.02% of total SEOs in the same period. Therefore, our sample is reasonably representative of SEO 
activities in the Chinese stock market during 1999-2006.  
For each SEO case we identify types of use of proceeds. Following the standard literature, we 
classify the use of SEO proceeds into three types: real investment ( InvestUSE ), debt repayment ( DebtUSE ), 
and corporate general purposes ( GeneralUSE ). The use of proceeds employed in the empirical analysis of 
this paper is the ultimate/realised use. We pay special attention to the use of SEO proceeds in the category 
of corporate general purposes ( GeneralUSE ). Obviously, it is highly likely that the firm can easily hide its 
true motivations for issuing SEOs by putting SEO proceeds into the category of corporate general 
purposes. The destination for the use of this type of SEO proceeds is essentially unknown because it is 
unspecified. Therefore, we focus on the use of unspecified SEO proceeds ( GeneralUSE ) in order to reveal 



































 (1) (2)  (3)= (2)-(1)  (4)  (5) (6)=(5)-(4) (7) (8) (9)=(8)-(7)  
1999 92.49 65.21 -27.28 0.47 0.44 -0.02 7.01 34.33 27.32 106 
2000 92.38 67.71 -25.25 0.82 0.92 0.10 6.80 31.96 25.15 175 
2001 95.28 75.42 -19.86 0 0 0 4.71 24.57 19.86 87 
2002 97.22 69.41 -27.80 0.66 0 -0.66 2.11 30.58 28.47 46 
2003 95.61 88.14 -7.46 0.69 2.01 1.31 3.69 9.84 6.15 39 
2004 97.66 77.56 -20.09 0 0 0 2.33 22.43 20.09 32 
2005 100 77.05 -22.95 0 0 0 0 22.95 22.95 3 
2006 96.43 68.33 -28.09 0.62 0.49 -0.12 2.94 31.16 28.22 45 
Average/
total 
95.29 73.60 -22.34 0.40 0.48 0.07 3.69 25.97 22.27 533 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin  
(2) InvestUSE stands for SEO proceeds that are used on investment; DebtUSE  stands for SEO proceeds that are used on debt repayment; 




 Table 1 provides a summary of three types of use of SEO proceeds. There are two patterns 
emerging from Table 1. Firstly, it shows that the sample firms mainly use SEO proceeds on either 
investment or corporate general purposes. They use very little SEO proceeds (or zero) on debt repayment.  
The difference between the planned use and the realized use for debt repayment is ignorable. Secondly, 
we observe from Table 1 that in each year during the sample period, the ratio of realized SEO proceeds 
used for new investment to total SEO proceeds is always lower than the ratio of planned use for 
investment, which suggests that firms often cut the amount of SEO proceeds used for investment after the 
issuance. On the other hand, the ratio of realized SEO proceeds used for corporate general purposes to 
total SEO proceeds is always higher than the ratio of planned use for corporate general purposes, 
suggesting that firms often increase the amount of SEO proceeds used for corporate general purposes 
after the issuance. These statistics provides us with preliminary evidence that the sample firms switched 
the use of SEO proceeds from the investment category to the category of corporate general purposes. It is 
important to note that the destination for the use of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general 
purposes is officially unspecified and essentially unknown.  
4. Empirical models and measurement of variables  
4.1 The empirical model for the change in the use of SEO proceeds  
The objectives of our empirical analysis are to explain why firms increase the use of SEO proceeds for 
corporate general purposes and how they use these unspecified SEO proceeds. We denote total SEO 
proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes as GeneralUSE  and the change in SEO proceeds in 
this category as GeneralUSE∆ . As shown in Table 1, when sample firms change the use of proceeds in the 
category of corporate general purposes, they always increase the amount of SEO proceeds in this category, 
hence GeneralUSE∆  is always positive. Therefore, in this paper by the change in use of SEO proceeds we 
mean the increase in the use of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes.  
 In the first step of the empirical analysis we estimate a Probit model in which the dependent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm changes (increases) the use of proceeds 
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for corporate general purposes. We define Change  =1 if the firm has put more SEO proceeds into the 
category of corporate general purposes after issuing SEOs, and Change  =0 otherwise. We measure the 
change in the use of proceeds for corporate general purposes ( GeneralUSE∆ ) in two ways: (a) Change in the 
absolute amount of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes, i.e. GeneralUSE∆ = Realized  GeneralUSE - 
Planned GeneralUSE ; (b) Change in the ratio of the use of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes to 
total SEO proceeds, i.e. RatioUSEGeneral∆ =Realized ( )proccedsTotalUSEGeneral -
( )proccedsTotalUSEPlanned General , which is the difference between the realized ratio of use of SEO 
proceeds for corporate general purposes to total SEO proceeds and  the planned ratio of use in this 
category to total SEO proceeds. We use two measures of changes in the use of SEO proceeds for 
corporate general purposes mainly for the sake of checking robustness. GeneralUSE∆  captures changes in 
SEO proceeds in the same category (corporate general purposes) after and before the SEO issuance, 
whereas RatioUSEGeneral∆  captures changes of SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes in relation to 
total SEO proceeds after and before the SEO issuance, the latter measure also contains information on 
other types of use of SEO proceeds.  
 The following Probit model is estimated to explain the change in the use of SEO proceeds for 
corporate general purposes: 
iiiiii TopturneStockLeverageSalesSizeChangeobit ebbbbbb ++++++= 1RePr)(Pr 543210   (1)  
Where 1=Change  if either 0>∆ GeneralUSE  or 0>∆ RatioUSEGeneral , respectively. The purpose of estimating 
the empirical model (1) is to examine factors explaining the likelihood of changes in the use of SEO 
proceeds for corporate general purposes, especially we are interested in whether or not the firm’s 
controlling shareholder is involved in the “bait and switch” tactic regarding the use of SEO proceeds. 1Top  
represents the voting and control power of the controlling shareholder of the firm, which is measured by 
the ratio of shares held by the largest shareholder to total shares of the firm. We include some other 
relevant factors: (1) firm size ( Size ), which is measured by the natural log of the firm’s total assets. Firm 
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size is important for the sources of financing accessible to the firm and hence it is relevant to how the firm 
uses SEO proceeds. (2) Sales ( Sales ) refers to the firm’s sales growth, which is measured by the annual 
growth rate of sales. It is possible that the firm changes its use of SEO proceeds due to the change in its 
growth opportunity after SEOs. (3) Leverage ( Leverage ) is measured by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets of the firm. Leverage is relevant for the firm when deciding how to use SEO proceeds. The 
availability of other sources of financing, such as borrowing and financial burdens associated with such 
borrowing, are relevant to the firm’s decision on the use of SEO proceeds. (4) The literature shows that 
Chinese firms intent to issue SEOs motivated by timing the market (e.g. Bo et al., 2011). Therefore, it is 
logical to include the firm’s pre-issue stock market returns ( turneStock RePr ) since the firm would adjust its 
use of SEO proceeds in response to changing market conditions. In the estimation, we use the 
observations taken from one year before the SEO year for Size , Sales , Leverage  and 1Top . turneStock RePr  is 
measured by the 12 months stock returns of the firm’s shares before SEOs.  
4.2 The empirical model for the use of unspecified SEO proceeds 
In order to examine how the firm uses unspecified SEO proceeds, i.e., SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes, we follow the modeling strategy proposed by Kim and Weisbach (2008) 
(hereafter the KW model). The KW model aims to explain whether or not SEO proceeds contribute to the 
changes in some accounting variables reflecting the firm’s real and financial activities, including the 
changes in total assets, inventory, capital expenditures, acquisitions, R&D, cash holdings, and reduction 
of long-term debt. Hence the dependent variable in the KW model is the change in a specific variable and 
the independent variables include SEO proceeds, firm size, year-dummies, and other sources of funds 
excluding SEO proceeds. Variables in the KW model are used in the form of the log transformation to 
minimize the effect of potential outliers. The original KW model can be written as: 
























where 0=t refers to the year when the firm issues SEOs and 3,2,1,0=t ; Y  stands for the dependent 
variable of concern. 2  For the balance sheet variables, the dependent variable in the KW model is 
constructed as the log of one plus the change in each variable normalized by total assets prior to the SEO 
issuance, whereas for variables taken from the income statement and the cash flow statement, the 
dependent variable is constructed as the log of one plus the accumulation of each variable since the SEO 
issuance, normalized by total assets prior to the SEO issuance. TA  stands for total assets of the firm. In 
the original KW model oceedsPr  stands for total SEO proceeds; esOthersourc stands for other sources of 
funds excluding SEO proceeds, which is measured as the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash 
inflow from disinvestment, and cash inflow from financing activities excluding proceeds from the current 
SEOs. In sum, the logic of the KW model (2) is to explain whether or not SEO proceeds contribute to the 
changes in the accounting variable of concern after controlling for other possible sources that could also 
contribute to the change in the variable of concern.  
We modify the KW model for our purposes of study. Firstly, we focus on the use of SEO proceeds in 
the category of general corporate purposes because it can more accurately reveal true motivations of firms 
for issuing SEOs. We use both GeneralUSE  and GeneralUSE∆  as key independent variables (in the form of log 
transformation), respectively. Secondly, we add the firm’s sales into the estimation since it is the most 
fundamental variable determining the firm’s overall performance, which is relevant to the changes in 
other accounting variables. We also control for year dummies. Industry effects are controlled by using the 










USEesOthersourcSalesSizeY ebbbbb +++++= −43210    (3)  
In this model, we use superscript kw  to indicate that the variables of concern are constructed in line 
with the original KW model, i.e. in the form of log transformation. We use four dependent variables in 
estimating the model (3), respectively. Firstly, we examine whether SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes are used to support capital expenditures. More specifically, the dependent 
2 For simplicity, we omit the firm’s subscript in model (2). 
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variable in this estimation is the log of one plus the accumulation of capital expenditures from the SEO 













CapExp . In this estimation, our key independent variable is either (a) the log of one 










USEUSE  or (b) the log of one plus change in SEO proceeds in the category of 











USEUSE .  
kwesOthersourc  stands for other sources of funds excluding SEO proceeds, which is defined as the same as 













esOthersourc . We also control for the sales 










SalesSalesSales . Firm size ( kwSize ) is the log of 
prior issue total assets of the firm as it is in the original K&W model, i.e., )ln( 1−= tkw TASize . After 
controlling for other possible contributing factors, we are able to examine whether or not the unspecified 
SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes can explain the accumulation of capital 
expenditures up to 3 years after SEOs,  
Secondly, we examine whether unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of general corporate 
purposes can explain changes in the firm’s borrowing after SEOs. The dependent variable in this 











DebtDebtDebt .  We use the same group of independent variables in this model.  
Thirdly, in the literature the firm’s market to book ratio is often chosen as a proxy for testing the 
market timing motive of SEOs (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, a higher market to book ratio 
may also indicate that the firm has a greater growth potential, and the firm that issues SEOs when its 
17 
 
stock is overvalued may want to raise capital to finance new investment but not necessarily to time the 
market. Firms that use SEO proceeds to finance investment when its market to book ratio is high should 
then be separated from those that issue SEOs to take the advantage of overvaluation. Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) document that the firms that really time the market will stockpile cash after SEOs. Hence we use 
the changes in the firm’s cash stock to infer the market timing motive for SEOs. In addition, using 
changes in the cash stock as the dependent variable in estimating the model (3) can also reveal whether or 
not the firm issue SEOs for the near-term need for cash (e.g. DeAngelo et al., 2010). In this model 
specification, the dependent variable is the log of one plus the change in the firm’s cash stock ( Cash ) 










CashCashCash .  
 As we discussed earlier, the firm’s decision to change the use of SEO proceeds is likely due to the 
manipulation of controlling shareholders. In the Chinese context, Related Party Transaction ( RPT ) is 
widely documented to be a popular way used by controlling shareholders to tunnel assets away from their 
listed firms at the expenses of minority shareholders (e.g. Jiang et al., 2010; Berkman et. al., 2010). In 
addition, Jian and Wong (2004) document that Chinese firms often increase related party transactions 
after SEOs, suggesting that SEOs provide resources for such tunneling behavior. Hence we examine 
whether or not the unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes can explain 
the changes in related party transaction )(RPT after SEOs. In this model specification, the dependent 
variable is the log of one plus the change in the volume of related party transaction normalized by prior 










RPTRPTRPT . Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables 







Table 2 Summary Statistics 
 Whole  stateTop1  soeTop1  othersTop1  
 Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev Mean  Std Dev 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size  21.3433 0.9204 21.3718 1.0232 21.3582 0.9264 21.2956 0.8236 
Sales  0.2916 0.3826 0.2304 0.3217 0.2859 0.3720 0.3500 0.4356 
Leverage  0.2213 0.1334 0.2293 0.1417 0.2121 0.1303 0.2305 0.1315 
rnestockretuPr  0.2891 0.5439 0.2135 0.4522 0.3216 0.5305 0.2942 0.6242 
1Top  0.4711 0.1806 0.4908 0.1761 0.5116 0.1667 0.3871 0.1798 
2Top  0.0765 0.0810 0.0553 0.0648 0.0698 0.0868 0.1046 0.0752 
CapExpkwt  
0.1167 0.0781 0.1181 0.0688 0.1148 0.0795 0.1188 0.0830 
Debtkwt  0.1459 0.1682 0.0272 0.0829 0.0278 0.0805 0.0446 0.0815 
Cashkwt  0.0930 0.0897 0.0811 0.0731 0.0841 0.0819 0.1107 0.0896 
RPT kwt  0.1089 0.1459 0.0776 0.1135 0.1260 0.1555 0.1047 0.1482 
kwSize  21.3433 0.9204 21.3718 1.0232 21.3582 0.9264 21.2956 0.8236 
kwSales  0.0919 0.0415 0.0873 0.0381 0.0933 0.0463 0.0933 0.0348 
kwesOthersourc   0.3334 0.1706 0.3439 0.1534 0.3085 0.1701 0.3682 0.1788 
kwGeneralUSE −   0.2031 0.1996 0.1931 0.2040 0.2159 0.1974 0.1893 0.1999 
kwGeneralUSE −∆  0.0193 0.0257 0.0177 0.0243 0.0205 0.0263 0.0186 0.0258 
.Obs   533 533 121 121 259 259 153 153 
Notes:  
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin  
(2) Explanation of variables:  
Size  and kwSize : Firm size, which is measured by the natural log of the firm’s total assets 
Sales : Firm’s sales growth, which is measured by the annual growth rate of sales 
Leverage  : Firm’s leverage, which is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm 
rnestockretuPr : Pre-issue stock returns, which is measured by the 12 months stock returns of the firm’s shares before SEOs. 
Topi : Ownership of the largest thi −  shareholder, which is measured by the ratio of shares held by the largest thi −  shareholder to total shares 
of the firm 
CapExpkwt : Changes in capital expenditures, which is the log of one plus the accumulation of capital expenditures from the year the firm issues 













Debtkwt : Changes in firm’s borrowing, which is measured by the log of one plus the change in the firm’s total debt normalized by prior issue 











Debt    
Cashkwt : Changes in cash stock, which is measured by the log of one plus the change in the firm’s cash stock ( Cash ) scaled by the firm’s prior 












RPT kwt : Changes in related party transaction, which is measured by the log of one plus the change in the volume of related party transaction 


























kwesOthersourc : Other sources of funds excluding SEO proceeds, which is measured as the sum of net cash flow from operations, cash inflow 














kwGeneralUSE − :  Total amount of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes, which is measured by the log of one plus total 










kwGeneralUSE −∆  Changes in total amount of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes, which is measured by the log of one 











USEUSE .  
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Explaining changes in the use of unspecified SEO proceeds  
Table 3 reports the results of estimating the empirical model (1) in which the dependent variable is the 
probability of having the dummy variable Change  =1 if the firm has increased SEO proceeds into the 
category of corporate general purposes, and Change  =0 otherwise. In Table 3a Change  =1 if 
0>∆ GeneralUSE and zero otherwise. As we can see from Table 3a, the estimated coefficient for firm size 
( Size ) is negatively significant in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), suggesting that larger firms are less likely 
to engage in the “bait and switch” tactic regarding the use of SEO proceeds. The estimated coefficient for 
sales ( Sales ) is negatively significant in columns (5) and (6) when the controlling shareholder of the 
issuing firm is a parent SOE, indicating that the firm changes the use of SEO proceeds in the direction 
opposite to sales growth of the firm. In another word, the firm does not change the use of SEO proceeds 
because of the change in the firm’s sales growth. The estimated coefficient for leverage ( Leverage ) is not 
significant in explaining the change in unspecified SEO proceeds. One clear-cut and important result 
shown in Table 3a concerns the firm’s pre-issue stock market returns ( turneStock RePr ). The estimated 
coefficient for turneStock RePr is highly positively significant in all but one estimated equations in Table 3a. 
This result strongly suggests that sample firms issue SEOs clearly driven by the market timing motive. 
When the firm’s pre-issue stock market returns are high (which means that the firm is likely to be 
overvalued by the stock market), firms rush to the stock market to raise equity capital via SEOs by 
promising shareholders to conduct new investment, the proceeds of which are then switched to the 
unspecified use in the category of corporate general purposes. This is consistent with the “bait and switch” 
tactic. As we mentioned earlier, since we examine the “bait and switch” behavior regarding the use of 
SEO proceeds, the most suspicious explanatory factor concerns the controlling shareholder of the issuing 
firm. This is because the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is severe in 
Chinese listed firms (e.g. Jiang et al., 2010; Berkman et al., 2010). Therefore, we examine whether or not 
the controlling shareholder )1(Top is involved in the decision of changing the use of SEO proceeds. As it is 
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shown in Table 3a, the estimated coefficient for the controlling shareholder’s ownership )1(Top is highly 
positively significant in 6 out of 8 cases. The result clearly confirms that the controlling shareholder is 
indeed important in making the “bait and switch” decision. The higher the ownership held by the 
controlling shareholder )1(Top , the more likely it is for the firm to put more SEO proceeds into the 
category of corporate general purposes after SEOs. Adding the 2nd largest shareholder’s ownership into 
the estimation does not change the nature of the result concerning the controlling shareholder. 
 In Table 3b we check the robustness of the results shown in Table 3a by defining Change  =1 if 
0>∆ RatioUSEGeneral . Here RatioUSEGeneral  refers to the ratio of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate 
general purposes to total SEO proceeds, hence RatioUSEGeneral∆ =Realized ( )proccedsTotalUSEGeneral -
( )proccedsTotalUSEPlanned General . The results shown in Table 3b are very consistent with that in Table 3a. 
Therefore, no matter how we measure the changes in unspecified SEO proceeds for corporate general 
purposes, two clear-cut results remain. Firstly, the sample firms are strongly driven by the market timing 
motive for issuing SEOs, which is supported by the result concerning the firm’s pre-issue stock market 
returns ( turneStock RePr ). The estimated coefficient for turneStock RePr is highly positively significant in 6 
out of 8 estimated equations in Table 3b.  Secondly, once again, we obtain from Table 3b that the higher 
the ownership held by the controlling shareholder )1(Top , the more likely it is for the firm to put more SEO 
proceeds into the category of corporate general purposes after SEOs. This result particularly applies to the 










Table 3a Explaining changes in the use of SEO proceeds:  Change =1 if 0>∆ GeneralUSE  
 Probit (Change =1) 
 Whole  stateTop1  soeTop1  othersTop1  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























































































Pseudo 2R  0.3786 0.3788 0.3428 0.3828 0.2508 0.2537 0.1449 0.1689 
nsObservatio  513 513 109 109 234 234 122 122 
Notes:  
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
(5) See notes to Table 2 for explanations of variables 
 
 
Table 3b Explaining changes in the use of SEO proceeds:  Change =1 if 0>∆ RatioUSEGeneral  
 Probit (Change =1) 
 Whole  stateTop1  soeTop1  othersTop1  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























































































Pseudo 2R  0.1113 0.1138 0.2172 0.2489 0.1087 0.1171 0.1161 0.1328 
nsObservatio  513 513 109 109 250 250 140 140 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 








 In sum, the results shown in both Tables 3a and 3b are consistent with the explanation that 
Chinese SEOs are mainly driven by the market timing motive and the “bait and switch” behavior 
regarding the use of SEO proceeds is associated with the conflict between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders.  
5.2 Explaining the use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on the whole sample  
In this section we discuss the results of estimating the empirical model (3) to reveal how firms use 
unspecified SEO proceeds. As we discussed already in Section 4.2, we are interested in four variables: 
capital expenditures, debt, cash stock, and related party transactions. These four variables are used as 
dependent variables respectively in estimating the empirical model (3). According to the KW model, the 
dependent variable used in the estimation is constructed in the way that reflects the changes (or the 
accumulation) of the variable of concern (details see Section 4.2). The idea is to see whether or not the 
use of unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes can explain the changes 
(or the accumulation) of the above-mentioned four variables up to 3 years after SEOs. 
 Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d report the results of estimating the empirical model (3) for the whole 
sample when capital expenditures ( )kwCapExp , debt ( )kwDebt , cash stock ( )kwCash , and related party 
transactions ( )kwRPT  are the dependent variable, respectively. The first four columns in these tables report 
the results concerning how the firm uses the increased amount of unspecified SEO proceeds in the 
category of corporate general purposes, i.e. kwgeneralUSE −∆ , and the last four columns of these tables report 
the results concerning how the firm uses the total amount of unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes, i.e. kwgeneralUSE − .  We follow the movement of each dependent variable from 
the SEO year (year t ) to the following three years after SEOs. In the estimation when the dependent 
variable is in year )( it + , where i =0, 1,2,3, the independent variables apart from kwgeneralUSE −∆  or 
kwgeneralUSE −  are the observations taken from year )1( −+ it . This way the result reveals whether 
unspecified SEO proceeds affect changes of the dependent variable of concern after controlling for other 
possible contributing factors.  
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Table 4a Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on the whole sample: Capital expenditures 
 CapExpkwt  CapExp
kw
t 1+  CapExp
kw
t 2+  CapExp
kw




t 1+  CapExp
kw
t 2+  CapExp
kw
t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

























































   
























2R  0.2130 0.3480 0.4074 0.3958 0.2176 0.2176 0.4084 0.3974 
nsObservatio  513 519 522 513 513 519 522 513 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 




Table 4b Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on the whole sample: Debt 
 Debtkwt  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
kw
t 2+  Debt
kw
t 3+  Debt
kw
t  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
kw
t 2+  Debt
kw
t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.0384 0.0825 0.1692 0.2715 0.0388 0.0837 0.1713 0.2748 
nsObservatio  515 517 517 512 515 517 517 512 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 




Table 4c Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on the whole sample: Cash holdings 
 Cashkwt  Cashkwt 1+  Cash
kw
t 2+  Cash
kw
t 3+  Cash
kw
t  Cashkwt 1+  Cash
kw
t 2+  Cash
kw
t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.2197 0.1394 0.1859 0.2183 0.2215 0.1403 0.1859 0.2183 
nsObservatio  511 515 521 509 511 515 521 509 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 




Table 4d Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on the whole sample: Related party transactions 
 RPT kwt  RPT kwt 1+  RPT
kw
t 2+  RPT
kw
t 3+  RPT
kw
t  RPT kwt 1+  RPT
kw
t 2+  RPT
kw
t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.0695 0.0962 0.1082 0.1145 0.0682 0.0927 0.1028 0.1065 
nsObservatio  518 522 524 514 518 522 524 514 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin  
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 













According to Table 4a, the estimated coefficient for sales ( kwSales ) is positively significant in all cases, 
suggesting that investment undertaken by the firm is driven by demand, which is consistent with the 
accelerator theory of investment (e.g. Jorgenson, 1971). The estimated coefficient for other sources of 
funds ( kwesOthersourc ) is also highly and positively significant in explaining the movement of the firm’s 
post-SEO capital expenditures, suggesting that new investment undertaken by sample firms after SEOs is 
financed by other sources of funds excluding SEO proceeds. More importantly for the purpose of the 
paper, the estimated coefficient for the use of unspecified SEO proceeds (either kwGeneralUSE −∆  or 
kwGeneralUSE − ) is always negatively significant in all the estimated equations in Table 4a. This result 
suggests that sample firms do not use unspecified SEO proceeds on capital investment, instead the more 
unspecified SEO proceeds the firm holds, the smaller amount of capital expenditures the firm undertakes. 
The negative association between these two variables confirms our observation from the raw data (see 
Table 1) that many sample firms switch the use of SEO proceeds from what was planned for new 
investment to unspecified uses by putting more SEO proceeds into the category of corporate general 
purposes. It is likely that the firm describes the use of SEO proceeds by promising using them on new 
investment, but later after issuing SEOs, the firm switches the use from investment to corporate general 
purposes. This result confirms the “bait and switch” tactic.  
 Table 4b shows that the estimated coefficient for the change in the use of SEO proceeds for 
corporate general purposes ( )kwGeneralUSE −∆  is negatively significant in column (4). In addition, the 
estimated coefficient for total SEO proceeds for corporate general purposes ( )kwGeneralUSE −  is negatively 
significant in columns (7) and (8). These results provide some evidence (3 out of 8 cases) that sample 
firms may use some unspecified SEO proceeds on retiring debt. Table 4b also shows that in 4 out of 8 
estimations (columns 2, 3, 6, and 7), the firm’s sales is positively associated with changes in debt. In 
addition, Table 4b also shows that changes in the firm’s debt after the SEOs issuance is mostly supported 
by other sources of funds excluding SEO proceeds, particularly in the years after the SEO year. The 
estimated result concerning the relationship between firm size and changes in debt is mixed.  
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 According to Table 4c, there is in general no association between the use of unspecified SEO 
proceeds and the firm’s cash stock up to 3 years after SEOs. Only in column (4) is the estimated 
coefficient for kwGeneralUSE −  positively significant, which can be seen as a weak support to the notion 
that the firm uses unspecified SEO proceeds to stockpile cash as far as the whole sample is concerned. 
Regarding other control variables, the estimated coefficient for firm size is negatively significant in all the 
cases in Table 4c, suggesting that larger firms normally hold less cash than smaller firms do, which is in 
line with the theoretical prediction (e.g. Kim et al., 1998). The estimated coefficient for sales and that for 
other sources of funds are positively significant in all the estimated equations in Table 4c, respectively, 
which is also in line with the results reported in other tables.   
 We observe from Table 4d that the estimated coefficient for firm size is positively significant in 
all cases, suggesting that on average larger firms have a larger scale of related party transactions than 
smaller firms. The estimated coefficient for sales is positively significant in 5 out of 8 cases (columns 
3,4,6,7, and 8), suggesting that the scale of related party transactions is also positively associated with 
sales. The estimated coefficient for other sources of funds is positively significant in columns 3, 4, 7, and 
8, suggesting that these related party transactions are also financed by other sources of funds excluding 
SEO proceeds. More importantly for the purpose of the paper, the estimated coefficient for the use of 
unspecified SEO proceeds is highly positively significant in many cases in Table 4d (columns 2, 3, 4, 7, 
and 8). This result suggests that sample firms use unspecified SEO proceeds on related party transactions. 
This result is important. This is because in the existing literature the evidence on related party transactions 
and tunneling in Chinese listed firms is largely derived by examining intercorporate loans. Here we 
provide new evidence supporting that the use of SEO proceeds is another possible channel through which 
related party transactions and tunneling can be conducted. 
 To summarize the result concerning the whole sample, we observe that: (1) sample firms on 
average do not use unspecified SEO proceeds on capital investment, instead they switch some SEO 
proceeds planned to be used for investment to unspecified SEO proceeds under the name of corporate 
general purposes. (2) Weak evidence shows that sample firms might use some unspecified SEO proceeds 
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on retiring debt. (3) There is very weak evidence in support of the notion that sample firms use 
unspecified SEO proceeds in stockpiling cash. (5) It is very likely that sample firms use unspecified SEO 
proceeds on related party transactions.  
 The above results are obtained based on the whole sample. If the firm’s controlling shareholder is 
involved in the “bait and switch” tactic regarding the use of SEO proceeds (see results in Section 5.1), 
then we would expect that the results based on the whole sample to vary depending on the nature of the 
firm’s controlling shareholder. In the following subsection, we discuss the results when the sample is split 
based on the nature of controlling shareholders.  
5.3 Does the nature of controlling shareholders matter for the use of unspecified SEO proceeds? 
Based on the results in Section 5.1, we see that the controlling shareholder of the firm is associated with 
whether or not the firm changes the use of SEO proceeds by putting more proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes after issuing SEOs. The higher the ownership held by the controlling 
shareholder, the higher the likelihood it is for the firm to engage in the “bait and switch” tactic. In this 
section, we examine how the nature of controlling shareholders affects the use of unspecified SEO 
proceeds. Based on the available information on ownership structure for our sample firms, we split the 
sample into three subgroups according to the nature of controlling shareholders: (a) the controlling 
shareholder is the state ( stateTop1 ), (b) the controlling shareholder is a parent SOE ( soeTop1 ), and (c) the 
controlling shareholders are other legal persons ( othersTop1 ). We repeat the estimations shown in Tables 
4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d for the three subsample groups. The results are reported in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 





Table 5a Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on stateTop1 sample: Capital expenditures 
 CapExpkwt  CapExp
kw
t 1+  CapExp
kw
t 2+  CapExp
kw




t 1+  CapExp
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t 3+  
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.2153 0.2739 0.3236 0.3851 0.2596 0.3185 0.3464 0.3966 
nsObservatio  119 119 120 116 119 119 120 116 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 5b Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on stateTop1 sample: Debt 
 Debtkwt  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
kw
t 2+  Debt
kw
t 3+  Debt
kw
t  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
kw
t 2+  Debt
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t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.0740 0.0721 0.1009 0.2217 0.0759 0.0718 0.1003 0.2221 
nsObservatio  119 118 120 117 119 118 120 117 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 5c Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on stateTop1 sample: Cash holdings 
 Cashkwt  Cashkwt 1+  Cash
kw
t 2+  Cash
kw
t 3+  Cash
kw
t  Cashkwt 1+  Cash
kw
t 2+  Cash
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t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.2964 0.1465 0.1140 0.1296 0.3151 0.1742 0.1545 0.1396 
nsObservatio  118 117 120 117 118 117 120 117 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 5d Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on stateTop1 sample: Related party transaction 
 RPT kwt  RPT kwt 1+  RPT
kw
t 2+  RPT
kw
t 3+  RPT
kw
t  RPT kwt 1+  RPT
kw
t 2+  RPT
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t 3+  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































    
























2R  0.2130 0.2503 0.2550 0.2538 0.2116 0.2459 0.2549 0.2563 
nsObservatio  120 120 121 120 120 120 121 120 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin  
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 
(5) See notes to Table 2 for explanations of variables 
 
 Tables 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d report the results of estimating the empirical model (3) for stateTop1  
firms when capital expenditures, debt, cash stock, and related party transactions are the dependent 
variable, respectively. The estimated results concerning other control variables are mostly in line with 
what we obtained in Table 4 for the whole sample. We here focus on the estimated results regarding the 
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use of unspecified SEO proceeds. From Table 5 we observe the followings: (1) the estimated coefficient 
for the use of unspecified SEO proceeds is always negatively significant in all cases in Table 5a, which is 
consistent with the corresponding result for the whole sample. This result confirms that firms on average 
do not use unspecified SEO proceeds on capital investment, instead the more unspecified SEO proceeds 
the firm holds, the smaller amount of capital expenditures the firm undertakes, which suggests that firms 
switch some proceeds planned to be used for investment to unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes. (2) Table 5b provides evidence that the state-controlled firms do not use 
unspecified SEO proceeds to retire debt. (3) According to Table 5c, the estimated coefficient for the use 
of proceeds is highly positively significant in 6 out of 8 cases, providing clear-cut evidence that the state-
controlled firms use unspecified SEO proceeds on stockpiling cash. (4) Table 5d shows that the state-
controlled firms do not use unspecified SEO proceeds on related party transactions. This result is 
consistent with Jiang et al (2010) who also document that the incentives for tunneling are greater among 
non-state controlled firms than the state-controlled firms. 
 In sum, Table 5 shows that the firms that have the state as the controlling shareholder are more 
likely to issue SEOs driven by the market timing motive and they use these unspecified SEO proceeds on 
stockpiling cash (see Table 5c). This result has a couple of implications. Firstly, it provides further 
evidence that the state-controlled listed firms are driven by the market timing motive when issuing SEOs. 
Kim and Weisbach (2008) document that the firms that really time the market will stockpile cash after 
SEOs. The result in Table 5c is consistent with the result shown in Tables 3a and 3b regarding the 
estimated result for the firm’s pre-issue stock market returns when the whole sample is concerned. When 
the firm’s pre-issue stock market returns are high (which means that the firm is likely to be overvalued by 
the stock market), firms rush to the stock market to raise equity capital via SEOs, the proceeds of which 
are then used to stockpile cash. Secondly, The result in Table 5c can also be linked to features of the 
Chinese financial system. It is widely documented that the combination of the state-controlled financial 
system and the state-dominated listed sector suggests that formal financing channels, including bank loans 
and stock markets, are mainly made available to large state-connected enterprises (e.g. Allen et. al.  2005). 
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Therefore, these state-controlled firms take that advantage of having access to the Chinese capital markets 
and raise as much as capital as they can, these proceeds are used to build up cash stock. These cash stock 
may be then used for other off-business activities. For example, according to the World Bank Report 
China 2030 (see World Bank, 2012), the state-dominated financial system and the state-dominated 
corporate sector in China suggest that many state-owned enterprises that can keep their earnings and have 
access to cheaper financing often operate outside their mandated areas by e.g. investing in real estate and 






















Table 6a Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on soeTop1 sample: Capital expenditures 
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2R  0.2232 0.3367 0.4027 0.3579 0.2208 0.3371 0.4031 0.3591 
nsObservatio  253 255 256 252 253 255 256 252 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 6b Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on soeTop1 sample: Debt 
 Debtkwt  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
kw
t 2+  Debt
kw
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2R  0.0496 0.0534 0.1596 0.2554 0.0546 0.0615 0.1687 0.2680 
nsObservatio  252 253 252 251 252 253 252 251 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin  
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 6c Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on soeTop1 sample: Cash holdings 
 Cashkwt  Cashkwt 1+  Cash
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2R  0.1891 0.1588 0.1898 0.1941 0.1876 0.1599 0.1913 0.1934 
nsObservatio  250 255 255 252 250 255 255 252 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 6d Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on soeTop1 sample: Related party transaction 
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2R  0.0780 0.0950 0.1192 .1147 0.0721 0.0847 0.1054 0.0934 
nsObservatio  255 256 257 250 255 256 257 250 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




  Tables 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d report the results of estimating the empirical model (3) for firms that 
have parent SOEs as their controlling shareholders ( soeTop1 ). For this group of firms, the result 
concerning both debt (Table 6b) and related party transactions (Table 6d) are important in terms of 
revealing the use of unspecified SEO proceeds. Table 6b shows that the estimated coefficient for the use 
of proceeds is negatively significant in 6 out 8 estimated equations, suggesting that this group of firms use 
unspecified SEO proceeds to retire debt. In addition, Table 6d shows that the estimated coefficient for the 
use of unspecified SEO proceeds is positively significant in 6 out of 8 cases, which clearly confirms that 
this group of firms use these unspecified SEO proceeds on related party transactions. Taken together, 
these results suggest that firms that have parent SOEs as their controlling shareholders spend unspecified 
SEO proceeds on both retiring debt and on related party transactions. This result logically leads to another 
question: whether or not are changes in the firm’s debt position and changes in the scale of related party 
transactions related with each other? According to Jiang et al. (2010) parent SOEs in Chinese listed firms 
often tunnel assets away from listed firms via related party loans. More specifically, Jiang et al. (2010) 
investigate intercorporate loans of Chinese listed firm during 1996-2006. They report that a significant 
proportion of such loans can be traced directly to controlling shareholders or their affiliates. Most of these 
loans did not accrue interest, and even when some interest was accrued, neither the interest nor the 
principles was ever paid back. Jiang et al (2010) suggests that related-party loans are likely related to 
related party transactions between listed firms and their controlling shareholders. Our result shown in 
Table 6d is consistent with Jiang et al (2010). It suggests that this group of sample firms may use 
unspecified SEO proceeds as intercoporate loans directed to their parent SOEs, which reduces the net debt 
position of the issuing firms. Moreover, intercoporate loans are likely related to other types of related 
party transactions. Therefore, it is likely that parent SOEs, as controlling shareholders, manipulate the use 
of SEO proceeds raised by their listed firms in order to support tunneling activities. Our results for this 
group of firms can be seen as new evidence of exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling 
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shareholders. It suggests that in China conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders are particularly severer in listed firms that are controlled by their parent SOEs.  
 
Table 7a Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on othersTop1 sample: Capital expenditures 
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2R  0.3243 0.4754 0.4970 0.4803 0.3139 0.4707 0.4950 0.4770 
nsObservatio  141 145 146 145 141 145 146 145 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 7b Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on othersTop1 sample: Debt 
 Debtkwt  Debtkwt 1+  Debt
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2R  0.1208 0.2500 0.3107 0.3555 0.1209 0.2488 0.3106 0.3631 
nsObservatio  144 146 145 144 144 146 145 144 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 7c Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on othersTop1 sample: Cash holdings 
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2R  0.2721 0.2038 0.2856 0.3410 0.2728 0.2071 0.2839 0.3426 
nsObservatio  143 143 146 140 143 143 146 140 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 




Table 7d Use of unspecified SEO proceeds based on othersTop1 sample: Related party transaction 
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2R  0.0798 0.0757 0.1171 0.1340 0.0857 0.0746 0.1145 0.1325 
nsObservatio  143 146 146 144 143 146 146 144 
Notes: 
(1) Data source: China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) database Sinofin 
(2) Standard errors are adjusted by industry-clusters 
(3) t-statistics are reported in the bracket 
(4) * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level 








 Tables 7a, 7b, 7c, and 7d report the results of estimating the empirical model (3) for the firms in 
which other legal persons are controlling shareholders ( othersTop1 ). This set of result does not provide 
clear-cut evidence on how these firms use unspecified SEO proceeds apart from the result concerning 
capital expenditures. According to Table 7a, it is clear that these firms on average do not use unspecified 
SEO proceeds on capital investment, instead they switch some proceeds planned to be used for 
investment to unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes. This result is 
consistent with the result regarding capital expenditures reported in other tables.  
6. Conclusions 
The literature identifies a few motives driving the firm’s SEO decision, such as to finance new investment, 
to retire debt, to meet near-term need of cash, all of these are related to real and financial activities of the 
issuing firm. Besides these motives, firms may issue SEOs for reasons unrelated to the firm’s real and 
financial activities. For example, a firm may issue SEOs to time the market or as a result of governance 
problems. Therefore, how firms uses SEO proceeds can reveal true motivations for issuing SEOs.  
 We observe that there exists a huge discrepancy between the planned use and the realized use of 
SEO proceeds in the Chinese corporate practice. Put it differently, firms promise potential investors to use 
SEO proceeds on new investment in their issue reports, but after SEOs are issued, many firms change the 
plan of using SEO proceeds. More specifically, we observe that many firms put more SEO proceeds into 
the category of corporate general purposes, while in the meantime they reduce the use of SEO proceeds 
on new investment. Because the use of SEO proceeds in the category of corporate general purposes is 
officially not specified, it provides the firm with a huge degree of discretion in deciding how to use these 
unspecified SEO proceeds. We refer to the above-mentioned conduct as the “bait and switch” tactic 
regarding the use of SEO proceeds. In this paper, we examine whether or not the controlling shareholder 
of the issue firm is involved in the change in the use of SEO proceeds and how firms ultimately use these 
unspecified SEO proceeds.  
 Using 533 SEOs during 1999-2006 we document that Chinese SEOs are mainly driven by the 
market timing motive and that controlling shareholders are involved in the “bait and switch” behavior 
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regarding the use of SEO proceeds. The higher the ownership held by the controlling shareholder, the 
higher the likelihood it is for the firm to engage in the “bait and switch” tactic. Our results show that the 
sample firms on average do not use unspecified SEO proceeds on capital investment, instead they switch 
from proceeds planned to be used for investment to unspecified SEO proceeds in the category of 
corporate general purposes. This result applies to firms regardless of the nature of the firm’s controlling 
shareholders. We also find that the nature of the controlling shareholder does matter for the use of SEO 
proceeds on other activities rather than capital investment. More specifically, the state-controlled firms 
raise equity capital via SEOs mainly driven by the market timing motive and they use SEO proceeds to 
stockpile cash. The firms that are controlled by parent SOEs use unspecified SEO proceeds to repay debt 
and to support related party transactions. Based on the evidence documented in previous studies, these 
two types of activities are related to parent SOEs (e.g. Jiang et al. 2010). If this is the case, then these 
firms change the use of SEO proceeds for the purpose of supporting tunneling activities undertaken by 
controlling shareholders. However, for the firms in which other legal persons are controlling shareholders, 
there is no clear-cut pattern about how these firms use unspecified SEOs proceeds expect that the SEO 
proceeds are not used for new investment. 
  Our research suggests that Chinese SEO market has been used by Chinese listed firms to time the 
market in order to collect SEO proceeds and then use them for non-investment purposes. Our research 
raises some questions on the efficiency of the Chinese stock market regarding the allocation of capital 
resources. Although it is widely documented that Chinese private Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
have hardly had any access to the stock market, the state-controlled firms have easy access to equity 
financing via SEOs because both the firm and the stock market regulator are state-connected. Our results 
show that the state-controlled firms time the market in issuing SEOs and then stockpile the proceeds as 
cash stock. These cash stock may then be used for other off-business activities (see World Bank, 2012). 
Our research also suggests that policy makers should pay close attention to the listed firms that are 
controlled by their parent SOEs because the problem of exploration of minority shareholders by 
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